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As in all the previous  editions,  this tenth edition  of the NBER Macroeco- 
nomics Annual presents  papers  devoted  to  frontier research  in  macro- 
economics  as  well  as  papers  that  apply  economic  analysis  to  current 
policy problems. 
The  first paper  of  the  conference,  by  Guiseppe  Bertola and  Andrea 
Ichino,  addresses  differences  in labor-market performance between  the 
United  States and Europe.  As has been  frequently noted,  the American 
labor market has in recent years exhibited relatively low unemployment 
rates but rising wage  inequality,  while  Europe has seen  the opposite- 
high unemployment  but no tendency  to greater inequality (except in the 
U.K.).  Bertola and  Ichino  argue that this contrasting  performance  may 
be the result of differences  in how  national labor markets respond  to an 
increase  in the  uncertainty  associated  with  the  productivity  of a given 
job.  The  reason  this  increased  uncertainty  has  different  effects  in  the 
U.S. and in Europe is that wages  clear the labor market in the former (so 
that the labor market is "flexible") while  the wage  is fixed and firing is 
prohibited  in Europe (so that its labor market is "rigid"). 
Based  on  this  stylized  characterization  of  U.S.  and  European  labor 
markets,  Bertola and Ichino develop  a theory which  shows  how  institu- 
tional differences  on the two  sides  of the Atlantic lead to different out- 
comes  in  response  to  similar shocks.  What is particularly novel  about 
their approach is that, unlike previous  attempts at such a common expla- 
nation of labor-market outcomes  in the two areas, it does not emphasize 
changes  in  the  productivity  of  people  with  different  skills.  Rather, it 
emphasizes  increased  volatility  over time in individuals'  productivities. 
In the  flexible  U.S.  labor market,  according  to Bertola and  Ichino,  this 
increased volatility translates into an increase in the volatility of individu- 
als' wages  so  that the  cross-sectional  dispersion  of wages  increases.  In 2 ?  BERNANKE  & ROTEMBERG 
Europe, wages  cannot adjust, so that the increased volatility in individu- 
als' productivities  simply  makes  firms more  reluctant to hire workers, 
increasing  aggregate  unemployment. 
The  authors  support  their  theoretical  arguments  with  evidence  on 
individual  wages,  as  well  as  on  regional  wages  and  unemployment 
rates.  Consistent  with  the  view  that  the  U.S.  market  responds  more 
flexibly to regional  changes  in productivity,  they  cite the fact that U.S. 
regional unemployment  rates are less persistent  than the corresponding 
European  rates.  This  suggests  that  in  the  U.S.,  wages  fall in  regions 
where  productivity  has fallen, which  leads workers to emigrate to more 
successful  regions.  An increase in the volatility of regional productivity 
should  therefore lead to an increase in the regional dispersion  of wages. 
The  authors  find  that,  indeed,  the  cross-sectional  variance  of regional 
wages  has increased  over time in the United States. 
The discussion  centered  on the degree  to which  various labor-market 
facts were or were not consistent  with the Bertola-Ichino  model.  Bertola 
and  Ichino  agreed  that a number  of labor-market outcomes  are consis- 
tent with  the idea that the relative productivity  of people  with  different 
skills has changed,  but they also pointed  to some  facts that suggest  that 
changes  in skill-based  productivity  are not the whole  story either. 
A long-simmering  debate in macroeconomics  concerns  the proper in- 
terpretation of the fact that labor productivity rises in booms  and falls in 
recessions.  There are essentially  three leading  explanations  for this fact. 
The first is that booms  and recessions  are themselves  due to changes  in 
technical  progress,  as  in  the  real-business-cycle  model.  The  second  is 
that there  are increasing  returns,  so that even  increases  in output  that 
are caused  by increases  in demand  raise productivity.  The third is that 
increases  in  output  are associated  with  a more  intense  use  of capital, 
labor, and other inputs. 
Following  the  influential  work  of  Robert Hall,  the  paper  by  Craig 
Burnside,  Martin Eichenbaum,  and  Sergio  Rebelo  dismisses  the  view 
that all productivity  movements  are due  to technical  progress,  on  the 
basis of the fact that productivity  remains procyclical even if one focuses 
only on output  movements  that are correlated with changes  in demand. 
For example,  productivity  remains procyclical even if one considers  only 
output  movements  correlated with nontechnological  factors such as the 
party of the  President,  changes  in military purchases,  and the price of 
oil.  A  novelty  of  Burnside,  Eichenbaum,  and  Rebelo's  analysis  is  that 
they  pay particular attention  to changes  in output  associated  with  vari- 
ous  measures  of monetary  policy, such  as changes  in the federal funds 
rate and nonborrowed  reserves. 
Burnside,  Eichenbaum,  and Rebelo then go on to argue forcefully for Editorial 3 
the view  that the bulk of cyclical changes  in productivity  (in particular, 
those associated  with demand  fluctuations) are due to cyclical changes  in 
factor inputs  and not to increasing returns. In particular, they argue that 
the procyclical movements  in labor productivity are almost entirely due to 
procyclical  movements  in the  utilization  of capital. Their conclusion  is 
based  on  their  demonstration  that electricity use  is  strongly  positively 
correlated with  the productivity  movements  associated  with changes  in 
demand.  They show  that, as long as one interprets a one-percent increase 
in electricity use as corresponding  to a one-percent  increase in the use of 
capital, the increase  in electricity use when  output rises is entirely suffi- 
cient to explain the increased productivity of labor, even in the presence of 
constant  returns to scale. 
The  discussion  at  the  conference  focused  to  a  large  extent  on  the 
robustness  of the findings.  In the published  version,  Burnside,  Eichen- 
baum,  and Rebelo show  that, indeed,  their findings  are not sensitive  to 
changes  in  sectoral  coverage  and  in  data  frequency,  and  to  certain 
changes  in the production-function  specification.  The conference  discus- 
sion suggested  that the most controversial aspect of the analysis may be 
the  authors'  assumption  that a one-percent  change  in electricity use  is 
associated  with a one-percent  increase in capital use.  If there is overhead 
capital,  a one-percent  increase  in energy  use  may be associated  with  a 
smaller percentage  increase in capital utilization.  In this case, their find- 
ings  regarding  electricity use  would  be consistent  with  the presence  of 
increasing  returns to scale. 
The next three sessions  were  concerned  with  inflation  and monetary 
issues.  In recent years  several  countries  with  chronically high  inflation 
rates have adopted  stabilization programs that were successful  in reduc- 
ing inflation.  These programs are notable for two reasons.  First, a central 
component  of these  programs has been the fixing of the exchange rate of 
the domestic  currency vis-a-vis  a more stable currency. Second,  the suc- 
cess  of these  programs is all the more stunning  in that output  generally 
expanded  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of inflation  stabilization.  At  the 
same  time,  these  stabilizations  have  generally been associated  with  ap- 
preciations  of  the  real exchange  rate and  subsequent  declines  in  eco- 
nomic activity. 
Sergio Rebelo and Carlos Vegh  display  these  and other stylized  facts 
associated  with  these  stabilizations  and evaluate various explanations  of 
these  facts.  To carry out this evaluation,  they consider a calibrated gen- 
eral equilibrium  model  in which  several  of the  channels  considered  in 
the earlier literature are present. In particular, they suppose  that a perma- 
nent  reduction  in inflation  reduces  the cost of transacting; this reduces 
what  amounts  to a tax on market activity and,  as a result,  raises output 4 *  BERNANKE  & ROTEMBERG 
and  employment.  A  second  mechanism  arises  when  the  reduction  in 
inflation  is perceived  as temporary; in this case,  economic  activity rises 
because  people  take advantage  of what they perceive to be a particularly 
good  time  to increase  both  consumption  and work effort.  Other chan- 
nels  they  consider  include  the effects  of the fiscal adjustment  that typi- 
cally  accompanies  these  stabilizations  as  well  as  the  effects  of  wage 
rigidity and inflation inertia. 
They show  that various combinations  of these features can explain the 
qualitative  features  of  the  actual  responses  to  stabilization  programs. 
However,  they  also show  that both the consumption  boom and the real 
appreciation  that  accompanies  these  stabilizations  are  quantitatively 
larger than those  implied by the model.  In the discussion,  several exten- 
sions  that might  improve  the  models'  performance  were  proposed.  In 
particular, Marianne  Baxter suggested  that it might  be useful  to distin- 
guish between  nondurable  and durable consumer purchases because the 
boom  in  consumer  purchases  involves  mainly  durables.  In  a  similar 
vein,  Jeff Sachs suggested  that the consumption  boom  might be due  in 
part to the  reemergence  of functioning  credit markets which  had been 
shut down  by inflation. 
The  second  monetary  paper  is by Stephen  Cecchetti,  whose  topic is 
the predictability  and controllability of inflation.  His work is motivated 
in  part by  the  Fed's  recent  policy  of trying  to  "stop inflation  before  it 
starts,"  as  opposed  to  a policy  of  waiting  for clear signs  of  emerging 
inflation  before  taking  action.  A  successful  strategy  of  "preemptive 
strikes" against  inflation  requires both  that the  Fed be able to forecast 
inflation  and  that  it  know  the  relationship  between  its  policy  instru- 
ments  and  future  inflation.  Cecchetti's  paper  investigates  both  issues. 
On the issue  of inflation's  forecastability, Cecchetti examines  the accu- 
racy of both private inflation forecasts and reduced-form prediction equa- 
tions using  popular inflation indicators.  The results here were generally 
discouraging:  Inflation  forecasts  by either method  do  not  substantially 
improve on naive,  random-walk forecasts. Further, reduced-form predic- 
tion  equations  for  inflation  show  considerable  evidence  of  structural 
instability, with  structural breaks particularly likely to occur during peri- 
ods  of change  in the monetary  policy  regime.  Similar problems  plague 
the relationship  between  monetary  policy instruments,  such as the fed- 
eral funds  rate, and inflation: In particular, although  an estimated  vector 
autoregression  (VAR) system  indicates  that, as expected,  an increase in 
the funds  rate leads  ultimately  to a lower price level,  the relationship  is 
not stable over time,  nor is it consistently  statistically significant. 
Despite  these  problems,  in the latter part of his paper Cecchetti uses 
his VAR framework to study  optimal policy rules. In general,  he defines Editorial 5 
a policy rule as a rule by which  the Fed adjusts the federal funds rate, as 
a function  of current and past shocks hitting the system.  Two interesting 
results  emerge:  First,  optimal  policies  that  attempt  to  stabilize  either 
inflation  or nominal  income  typically involve  rapidly raising (lowering) 
the  funds  rate,  then  bringing  it back  down  (up)  slowly;  this  pattern 
contrasts  with  the  Fed's  usual  practice  of  making  a lengthy  series  of 
interest-rate  moves  in  the  same  direction.  Second,  rules  that  stabilize 
nominal  income  seem  more  robust  than  rules  that  stabilize  the  price 
level,  in  the  sense  that  the  former  also  produces  a fairly stable  price 
level,  while the latter does not produce a stable path for nominal income. 
Cecchetti's  optimal  policy rules evoked  much interest among  the dis- 
cussants  and  other  participants.  Several  people  raised  the  issue  of 
whether  Cecchetti's  results  on inflation  forecasting  are too pessimistic; 
barring unexpected  events  like oil shocks,  it was  suggested  that more 
structural modeling  and  the  use  of  extramodel  information  and  judg- 
ment by forecasters can produce forecasts of inflation that are acceptably 
good-better,  in  any  case,  than  forecasts  of  some  other  major macro 
variables. 
The next  set of papers  on monetary  economics  addresses,  in sympo- 
sium  format,  the  issue  of the  optimal  institutional  design  for a central 
bank.  In particular, does  making  the central bank more independent  of 
the rest of the government  reduce inflation and improve  economic  per- 
formance?  Papers  on  this  topic  were  presented  by  Carl Walsh,  Adam 
Posen,  and Stanley Fischer. 
Walsh analyzes  the issue  of central bank independence  from the "opti- 
mal  contracting"  perspective.  In his  view,  politicians  should  take  the 
lead in establishing  the goals of the central bank, but the bank should be 
given  autonomy  in deciding  how  to achieve  those  goals  (i.e.,  the bank 
should  have  instrument  independence  but  not  goal  independence,  in 
Fischer's  terminology).  The  central bank  should  then  be  rewarded  or 
punished  (for example,  the  Governor  could  be  given  a raise or fired), 
according  to how  close  it comes  to meeting  the goals.  If the underlying 
cause  of  inflation  is  time  inconsistency  (a la Kydland  and  Prescott  or 
Barro and  Gordon),  and  if the  central bank shares  society's  objectives 
with  regard  to  output  and  inflation,  then  it turns  out  that the  central 
bank's  goals  can be set solely  in terms of an inflation target; penalizing 
the central bank for a high inflation rate has the effect of eliminating  the 
inflation  "bias" while  retaining  incentives  for the  central bank to opti- 
mally trade off inflation  and output  in the short run. If the central bank 
does  not  share  society's  objectives,  then  a more  complicated  contract 
may be necessary. 
Walsh  suggests  that  the  optimal-contracting  model  has  been  most 6 - BERNANKE  & ROTEMBERG 
faithfully  followed  in New  Zealand.  The 1990 Reserve  Bank Act set up 
procedures  for  determining  price-level  targets,  defined  contingencies 
under which  the targets can be changed,  and established  procedures  for 
disciplining  the  central bank if targets are not met.  Although  the  new 
regime is still largely untested,  the early inflation performance has been 
good.  In contrast,  according  to  Walsh,  recent  European  reforms  have 
emphasized  increased  goal independence  for central banks,  rather than 
the combination  of instrument  independence  and greater accountability 
implied  by the optimal contracting approach. 
Posen's  paper takes issue  with  the premise  that institutional  changes 
could  have  a first-order effect on inflation performance.  He argues that 
the  most  important  determinant  of  a  country's  inflation  rate  is  the 
strength  of organized  political opposition  to inflation. 
In practice,  this  opposition  is most  likely  to come  from the  financial 
sector.  Posen  discusses  the  factors that are likely  to increase  effective 
financial  sector  opposition  to  inflation,  among  them  the  presence  of 
universal  banking,  a  federal  political  structure,  and  a  fractionalized 
legislature.  Based on his analysis,  he constructs an indicator of financial 
opposition  to  inflation  (FOI)  for  a  sample  of  32  low-to-moderate- 
inflation  countries.  He  shows  that  the  much-remarked-upon  negative 
correlation between  central bank independence  (CBI) and average infla- 
tion might  be spurious,  the result of the fact that countries  with  a high 
FOI  tend  to  have  both  high  CBI and  low  inflation.  Indeed,  cross- 
sectional  regressions  of  inflation  against  both  FOI and  the  portion  of 
CBI unrelated  to FOI place  virtually all of the explanatory  power  with 
the  former,  while  the  latter  has  little  effect  (even  entering  with  the 
"wrong" sign).  Posen  concludes  that, if effective  political opposition  to 
inflation  is absent,  increasing  the independence  of the central bank will 
do little to improve  a country's inflation performance. 
In his  paper,  Fischer acknowledges  the  relevance  of politics  to eco- 
nomic outcomes,  but disagrees with Posen's conclusion  that institutional 
design  is  therefore  unimportant.  In general,  Fischer  takes  a  position 
closer to Walsh's,  suggesting  that the best arrangement involves  setting 
clear objectives  for the central bank, giving it autonomy  to pursue those 
goals,  and  then  holding  it accountable  for the outcome.  One  means  of 
establishing  objectives for the central bank is the currently popular strat- 
egy of setting explicit inflation targets. Fischer finds this approach attrac- 
tive for its simplicity and clarity; he argued that inflation targeting is not 
necessarily  inconsistent  with  a degree  of output  stabilization,  if provi- 
sion is made for adjusting the target inflation rate when  there are supply 
shocks.  He also discusses  the uses  of fixed exchange  rates as a means of Editorial  7 
stabilizing  inflationary  expectations,  and  perhaps  as a step  toward  ex- 
plicit inflation  targeting. 
A  lively  discussion  followed  the  presentations.  The topics  receiving 
the most  attention  were  the relative importance  of political and institu- 
tional  factors and  the  desirability  of inflation  targeting.  With regard to 
the  latter  topic,  issues  raised  included:  whether  it  is  better  to  target 
inflation or nominal income; whether it is preferable to target inflation or 
the  price  level;  and  whether  inflation  targeting  is  useful  for  high- 
inflation or hyperinflationary  countries. 
In our last paper, Gary Gorton and Richard Rosen concern themselves 
with  the  use  of  derivative  securities  by  commercial  banks.  In  recent 
years there has been a substantial increase in the use of derivative securi- 
ties,  ranging  from  simple  swaps  and  options  to  highly  complex  and 
specialized  instruments.  Although  the putative  purpose  of the trade in 
derivatives  is to facilitate risk-sharing and increase market liquidity, the 
existence  of  these  instruments  also  creates a potential  principal-agent 
problem,  in  that  they  provide  traders  with  a  means  for  taking  large 
gambles which  are difficult for outsiders to monitor. The Orange County 
and  Baring episodes  are two  dramatic examples  of individual  decision 
makers losing  literally billions  of dollars of other people's  money  while 
speculating  in derivatives  markets. 
The principal-agent  problem associated  with derivatives  is of particu- 
lar concern in the context  of commercial banking,  because  of the central 
role played  by banks in the financial system,  and because of the possible 
incentives  to risktaking created by deposit  insurance and the too-big-to- 
fail doctrine.  Indeed,  a significant  fraction of the huge  trade in deriva- 
tives  (the notional  value of interest-rate swaps  outstanding  at the end of 
1992 was  $6.0  trillion)  passes  through  a small  number  of large  dealer 
banks.  In their paper, Gorton and Rosen attempt to estimate  the market 
value  and  interest-rate  sensitivity  of  the  aggregate  swap  positions  of 
U.S.  commercial  banks  (swaps  are both  the  simplest  and  most-traded 
type of derivative).  Since unbalanced  swaps  positions  can be hedged  by 
other  assets,  Gorton  and  Rosen  also  attempt  to  determine  the  net 
interest-rate risk faced by the banking system. 
In trying to measure banks' exposure  to swap-related risk, Gorton and 
Rosen  face  the  problem  that has  plagued  all researchers  in  this  area, 
which  is  a lack  of  publicly  available  data.  The  quarterly Call Reports 
contain  several summary  measures  of banks' swaps  positions,  but with- 
out additional  assumptions  these  are inadequate  for estimating  the rele- 
vant  quantities.  Gorton  and  Rosen  show  that the  data can be used  to 
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assume  that (1) the maturity structure of swaps  contracts written is con- 
stant,  and  (2) the direction  (long  or short) of new  contracts is also con- 
stant.  Under  these  assumptions  Gorton and  Rosen  find that,  in recent 
years,  banks'  swap  books  have  not been  balanced: In one  intermediate 
scenario,  for  example,  the  authors  estimate  that  a  100-basis-point  in- 
crease  in  interest  rates  would  induce  bank  losses  on  swaps  equal  to 
about  5% of  bank  equity.  However,  the  fact that  swap  books  are not 
balanced  does  not mean  that bank portfolios  as a whole  are excessively 
risky. The authors perform a regression  analysis which shows  that, over- 
all, bank net income  is not particularly sensitive  to interest-rate changes, 
implying  that banks'  swap  positions  are largely hedged  (this is particu- 
larly the case for dealer banks). 
Much of the discussion  focused  on the sensitivity  of the authors' con- 
clusions  to alternative assumptions.  While it was agreed that Gorton and 
Rosen had done  a nice job with the data available, some participants felt 
that  the  data  were  simply  not  informative  enough  to  support  strong 
conclusions.  Several people  took the view  that the opacity of derivatives 
transactions  made  these  instruments  particularly vulnerable  to  moral 
hazard problems  and urged improvements  in monitoring and reporting. 
The  conference  at  which  these  papers  were  presented  was,  once 
again,  remarkably well  organized  by Kirsten Foss Davis and Rob Shan- 
non.  Ilian Mihov  acted as editor for the papers and comments  and also 
as rapporteur for the general discussion.  He has done  a fantastic job. To 
these  individuals,  and to Martin Feldstein  and the NBER for continued 
support  of the Macro Annual  conference,  we owe  our thanks. 
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